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The use of psychological and psychiatric evaluations forthe courts has grown considerably in the last threedecades.1 For the purposes of this article, we will refer to
such an evaluation as a forensic mental-health assessment
(FMHA). There are two important components to the defini-
tion of FMHA. First, such activity involves evaluations con-
ducted in the context of criminal or civil proceedings.2 Second,
it includes certain kinds of tasks—such as reconstructing a
past mental state and linking it with the functional-legal capac-
ities specified in a given legal test (such as insanity at the time
of the offense) or evaluating a current mental state and
appraising the extent to which it affects such functional legal
capacities (such as those described in competence-to-stand-
trial evaluations).3
We begin by discussing FMHA in greater detail. This dis-
cussion includes broad foundational principles applicable to
all such evaluations, as well as a brief description of 17 com-
monly evaluated types of FMHA. In this context, we then turn
to the use of third-party information, or TPI (collateral inter-
views, records, and other documents or digital evidence), in
FMHA. This discussion will address the importance, the value
and limitations, and the current legal and professional status of
TPI in forensic assessment. 
NATURE AND TYPES OF FMHA
There are certain broad, foundational principles that are
applicable to all FMHA, even that conducted in response to
different legal questions, in different domains (civil vs. crimi-
nal vs. juvenile/family), and with different populations. These
principles have been derived, described,4 and subsequently
modified.5 They are presented sequentially (in the order in
which they apply when conducting FMHA).6
One reflection of the progress of forensic psychology and
forensic psychiatry as specialty disciplines is the recent com-
pletion of a book series devoted to best practices in FMHA.
The series includes 17 books,7 the first describing foundational
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TABLE 1
TITLES IN OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS SERIES: BEST 
PRACTICES IN FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT
Criminal Titles
Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial
Evaluation of Criminal Responsibility
Evaluation of Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights 
Evaluation of Sexually Violent Predators
Evaluation for Risk of Violence in Adults 
Evaluation for Capital Sentencing 
Civil Titles
Evaluation of Capacity to Consent to Treatment and Research
Evaluation for Guardianship
Evaluation for Civil Commitment
Evaluation for Personal Injury Claims 
Evaluation for Workplace Discrimination and Harassment 
Evaluation of Workplace Disability
Juvenile and Family Titles
Evaluation for Child Custody 
Evaluation of Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial
Evaluation for Risk of Violence in Juveniles 
Evaluation for Parenting Capacity in Child Protection
Adapted with permission from KIRK HEILBRUN ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF FORENSIC MEN-
TAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT 148 (2009).
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principles of FMHA8 and the remainder each devoted to a par-
ticular legal question for which FMHA may be useful in pro-
viding relevant evaluative information and opinions to the
court.9 The FMHA principles were derived to distinguish
forensic evaluation from other forms of psychological and psy-
chiatric assessment (done primarily for the purposes of diag-
nosis and treatment planning) and are supported by sources of
authority that include law, science, ethics, and practice;10 they
were subsequently expanded to include additional material
developed between 2001 and 2009.11 Since this range of topics
was selected to encompass the kinds of evaluations most often
requested by courts and attorneys, it seems reasonable to con-
sider these 16 specific topics as encompassing nearly the entire
range of topics that are addressed with any frequency by
FMHA. 
Competence to Stand Trial. This legal question concerns
whether a juvenile12 or criminal defendant13 is fit to proceed
with disposition of charges. The applicable legal test is whether
the individual “has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.”14
Criminal Responsibility. Unlike competence to stand trial,
there is no single legal standard for criminal responsibility. The
M’Naghten standard is used in a number of U.S. jurisdictions:
To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must
be proved that, at the time of the committing of the act,
the party accused was laboring under such a defect of rea-
son, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing or if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.15
The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code proposed
in 1962 that a defendant be acquitted by reason of insanity if
“as a result of mental illness or mental defect he lacked sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law,”16 a standard which was adopted in a number of states and
the federal jurisdiction and amended in some jurisdictions
post-Hinckley to drop the “volitional prong” (“conform con-
duct to the requirements of the law”). Four states have abol-
ished the insanity defense; New Hampshire continues to use
the product standard17 that would acquit a defendant by reason
of insanity if the criminal behavior was the “product of mental
disease or defect.”18
Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights. Juvenile or criminal
suspects undergoing custodial interrogation have Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights.19 Defendants who choose to waive
these rights must do so in a knowing, intelligent, and volun-
tary fashion in order for any inculpatory statement to be
admissible.20 FMHA on this topic can assist the court in deter-
mining whether a defendant in custody had the requisite
capacities to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver.21
Sexual Offenders: Sentencing, Registration/Community
Notification, and Post-Sentence Commitment. There are differ-
ent legal questions that pertain to convicted sexual offenders.
These include whether the convicted offender meets criteria
for an enhanced sentence, whether an offender living in or
returning to the community meets criteria for registration or
community notification, and whether offenders meet special-
ized civil-commitment criteria22 following completion of a
criminal sentence. Since these criteria vary somewhat, it is
important that FMHA focus on the particular legal question
and the specific capacities associated with it.23
Risk of Violence in Adults and Juveniles. The field has
advanced considerably in the last 25 years in providing empir-
ically supported appraisal of the risk of future violence or other
offending.24 Such risk assessment, when accompanied by the
appraisal of needs and responsivity,25 is typically not a legal
question in the same respect as other legal questions noted in
this section. Rather, risk assessment is a component of a vari-
ety of criminal and civil questions for adults26 and juveniles.27
Capital Sentencing: Aggravation and Mitigation. Under Fur-
man v. Georgia,28 capital punishment as it was then practiced in
the United States was held to be unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court. An individualized consideration
of the aggravating and mitigating factors for each defendant
provides a framework that satisfies constitutional demands.29
Accordingly, FMHA conducted in the context of capital sen-
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tencing provides information regarding the statutorily enu-
merated aggravating and mitigating factors—and other infor-
mation not specifically cited in statutes that may be relevant to
the court’s or jury’s determination of whether a capital sentence
should be imposed.30
Capacity to Consent to Treatment and Research. Turning
from criminal to civil legal questions, the question may arise
regarding whether an individual has the requisite capacities to
consent to various kinds of treatments or to participate in a
research study. The construct of informed consent is essential in
gauging whether an individual has such capacity. The contem-
porary “patient-centered standard”31 for such informed consent
was enumerated in Canterbury v. Spence,32 involving the focus
on the patient’s understanding rather than the doctor’s profes-
sional discretion in determining what information should be
conveyed as part of obtaining such consent. FMHA regarding
such capacity has been guided by the work of investigators who
have identified four relevant components: understanding,
appreciating, reasoning, and communicating a choice.33
Guardianship. This is a legal process in which an individual,
possibly unable to manage his or her personal or financial
affairs, is reviewed by the court, which appoints a substituted
decision maker if that person is incompetent for such func-
tions.34 Tasks such as making a will, voting, marrying, driving
a car, making financial transactions, and other aspects of inde-
pendent living are included among the areas covered in
guardianship proceedings. In the absence of relevant Supreme
Court caselaw, the legal standards vary by jurisdiction, with
capacities such as understanding, reasoning, and communica-
tion among those important in FMHA evaluations of this kind
of competence.35
Civil Commitment. The question of whether an individual
with a mental disorder should be involuntarily committed to a
hospital is answered somewhat differently across different
states. Generally, commitment criteria contain a prong reflect-
ing the presence of such a mental disorder and a second prong
on the question of whether the individual, as a result of the
symptoms of such a disorder, would be a danger to others or
self (either through active self-harm or grave disability).
FMHA provides information both about the nature of the men-
tal disorder and the risk of harm to self or others that results.36
Personal Injury. The applicability of FMHA in personal-
injury litigation is generally limited to cases in which it is
alleged that the defendant, owing a duty to the plaintiff but
breaching that duty, proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer
mental/emotional harm, sometimes in combination with phys-
ical harm.37 The forensic mental-health evaluations in this area
consequently focus on the nature and genuineness of the
plaintiff’s reported symptoms and the extent to which they
were caused by the alleged conduct of the defendant. 
Workplace Discrimination and Harassment. This is a partic-
ular form of personal injury that is governed by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), which prohibits discrimination
based on race, color, national origin, or gender in the work-
place.38 The considerations for FMHA evaluation in this area
are similar to those in personal injury more generally: whether
the plaintiff has suffered mental/emotional injury resulting
from the defendant’s alleged behavior.
Workplace Disability. The other major workplace issue that
can be addressed through FMHA involves whether an individ-
ual is disabled from working. This is not necessarily a legal
matter, as workplace disability decisions may relate to the
applicability of private disability insurance. The more clearly
legal components in this domain encompass matters such as
eligibility for Social Security Disability Income or cases involv-
ing workers compensation.39 Relevant FMHA focuses on the
nature of the mental disorder and its impact on the functional
capacities that are important in the workplace.
Child Custody. Determining the custodial arrangement that
will serve the best interest of a child whose parents divorce can
be complex and sometimes contentious. Within the umbrella
of this “best interest” standard are the components of the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act, which have been adopted
directly by a number of states, including parental wishes;
child’s wishes; relationship of the child with any persons who
may significantly affect the best interest; the child’s adjustment
to home, school, and community; and the mental and physical
health of all involved.40 FMHA in this area can be comparably
complex, as it is important to provide evaluative information
regarding each parent, each child, and the relationships of the
children with important others.
Parenting Capacity in Child Protection. The final domain
covered in the Oxford best-practices series involves the ques-
tion of when a child should be removed from the custody of a
parent due to incapacity. Parenting rights have been recognized
as fundamental41 although not absolute42—and legal authori-
ties are understandably reluctant to terminate parental rights
without compelling reason.43 Evaluations conducted by foren-
18 Court Review - Volume 51 
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sic clinicians can help the court make decisions involving con-
ditions of access, with a specific focus on the harm that may
occur and the parent’s role in exacerbating (or minimizing)
such risk of harm.44
USING TPI IN FMHA
Third-party information in FMHA refers to information
obtained directly from parties who are not litigants; it also
encompasses records that are relevant to the litigant’s history
(whether they are yet part of the evidentiary record). Such
records are considered broadly to encompass letters, diaries, e-
mail and text messages, postings on social-media sites, and
other sources of information that may have originated with the
litigant but now exist in archival form. 
In addressing the value of TPI for FMHA, it is useful to
ground this discussion in the FMHA principles discussed
TABLE 2
PRINCIPLES OF FORENSIC MENTAL-HEALTH ASSESSMENT
GENERALLY
1. Be aware of the important differences between clinical and
forensic domains.
2. Obtain appropriate education, training, and experience in
one’s area of forensic specialization.
3. Be familiar with the relevant legal, ethical, scientific, and prac-
tice literatures pertaining to FMHA.
4. Be guided by honesty and striving for impartiality, actively
disclosing the limitations on as well as the support for one’s
opinions.
5. Control potential evaluator bias in general through monitor-
ing case selection, continuing education, and consultation
with knowledgeable colleagues.
6. Be familiar with specific aspects of the legal system, particu-
larly communication, discovery, deposition, and testimony.
7. Do not become adversarial, but present and defend your opin-
ions effectively.
IN SPECIFIC CASES
Preparation
8. Identify relevant forensic issues.
9. Accept referrals only within area of expertise.
10.Decline the referral when evaluator impartiality is unlikely.
11.Clarify the evaluator’s role with the attorney.
12.Clarify financial arrangements.
13.Obtain appropriate authorization.
14.Avoid playing the dual roles of therapist and forensic evalua-
tor.
15.Determine the particular role to be played within forensic
assessment if the referral is accepted.
16.Select the most appropriate model to guide data gathering,
interpretation, and communication.
Data Collection
17. Use multiple sources of information for each area being
assessed. Review the available background information and
actively seek important missing elements.
18. Use relevance and reliability (validity) as guides for seeking
information and selecting data sources.
19. Obtain relevant historical information.
20. Assess clinical characteristics in relevant, reliable, and valid
ways.
21. Assess legally relevant behavior.
22. Ensure that conditions for evaluations are quiet, private, and
distraction-free.
23. Provide appropriate notification of purpose and/or obtain
appropriate authorization before beginning.
24. Determine whether the individual understands the purpose
of the evaluation and the associated limits on confidentiality.
TABLE 2 (continued)
PRINCIPLES OF FORENSIC MENTAL-HEALTH ASSESSMENT
Data Interpretation
25. Use third-party information in assessing response style.
26. Use testing when indicated in assessing response style.
27. Use case-specific (idiographic) evidence in assessing clinical
condition, functional abilities, and causal connection.
28. Use nomothetic evidence in assessing clinical condition, func-
tional abilities, and causal connection.
29. Use scientific reasoning in assessing causal connection between
clinical condition and functional abilities.
30. Carefully consider whether to answer the ultimate legal ques-
tion. If it is answered, it should be in the context of a thorough
evaluation clearly describing data and reasoning and with the clear
recognition that this question is in the domain of the legal decision
maker.
31. Describe findings and limits so that they need change little
under cross-examination.
Written Communication
32. Attribute information to sources.
33. Use plain language; avoid technical jargon.
34. Write report in sections, according to model and procedures.
Testimony
35. Base testimony on the results of the properly performed
FMHA.
36. Prepare.
37. Communicate effectively.
38. Control the message. Strive to obtain, retain, and regain con-
trol over the meaning and impact of what is presented in
expert testimony.
Used with permission from KIRK HEILBRUN ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF FORENSIC MENTAL
HEALTH ASSESSMENT 135-37 (2009).
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above and in Table 2 and to consider the various forms of
FMHA that must incorporate such TPI. 
THE IMPORTANCE AND VALUE OF TPI
Forensic clinicians widely recognize the importance and
value of TPI, whether in the form of documents and records,
third-party interviews, or scientific data produced by
researchers. This is true both for FMHA in general45 and for
specific types of FMHA.46 In the section that follows, we dis-
cuss the advantages of TPI from the perspective of forensic
evaluators in three stages of the FMHA process: data collec-
tion, data interpretation, and written communication.47
For several reasons, clinicians conducting FMHA typically
place less faith in and reliance on an examinee’s self-report
than do evaluators conducting traditional clinical assess-
ments.48 First, the purposes of the two types of assessment dif-
fer. The purpose of the forensic mental-health evaluation is to
assist the trier of fact, not necessarily to help individual exam-
inees—whether in defending their cases or in treating their
behavioral-health needs.49 As a result, FMHA includes more
concern for how an examinee approaches an evaluation, both
in ability and in motivation to accurately report information.50
This approach comprises an examinee’s response style.51 In
addition, many forensic questions are retrospective (e.g., men-
tal state at the time of the offense, Miranda waiver, prior testa-
mentary capacity). As a result, examinees may forget some or
much about relevant past events. Information recorded closer
in time to such events, or that is consistent across or distinc-
tively recalled by collateral informants, can thus improve the
accuracy of a reconstructed history.52
The task of a forensic clinician has been compared to that of
an investigative journalist.53 During the data-collection
process, TPI is collected to seek a fuller picture of the exami-
nee—his or her background, behavioral-health symptoms and
functioning, functional legal capacities, and response style—
through a review of information not fully provided by other
sources of data such as self-report and evaluator observations.
Compiling increasing amounts of information using a multi-
method and multi-source approach allows potential explana-
tions to be tested with case-specific details.54 Forensic clini-
cians can also use TPI to help focus the report of an examinee
or collateral informant, taking care not to influence this
account by providing leading information.55
TPI is also important at the data-interpretation stage, where it
can be compared to information obtained directly from the eval-
uee to assess the consistency of information across sources.56
Such a comparison is particularly useful in reaching a conclu-
sion about an individual’s response style—whether the individ-
ual is deliberately distorting the description of mental-health
symptoms or intellectual functioning. TPI can also fill in inad-
vertent gaps in self-report information. As such, TPI increases
the perceived reliability of FMHA by addressing concerns about
examinee omissions or misreporting.57 Some psychological tests
actually require TPI for test scoring or interpretation.58
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report’s relevance, helpfulness, and quality. Lander & Heilbrun,
supra note 46, at 119. Use of TPI to assess response style, in par-
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ity ratings only (not relevance or helpfulness). Id. Another study
using mock jurors looked at TPI that either supported or coun-
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with the expert’s opinion, the majority tended to make their final
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opinion, most initially disagreeing mock jurors switched their
vote to be in line with the expert’s opinion; if the TPI was incon-
sistent, few switched to agree with the expert’s opinion. Id.
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at 274.
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In communicating TPI results, it is important to identify the
source; the reader must be informed what information was col-
lected from whom, when, and how.59 This attribution enables
the reader to determine whether information is consistent
across sources; when there is a question about the veracity of
specific TPI, such attribution also allows a judgment about
how relying on this TPI might affect the broader conclusions.
Plain-language TPI is also helpful to quote.60 Synthesizing TPI
and other sources of information thus facilitates report writing
and testimony that is logical, data driven, and communicated
in a manner easily understood by legal professionals.61 The
forensic clinician’s opinions will have more credibility, and
legal decision making will be improved because the evaluator’s
reasoning, as well as the limitations of his or her knowledge,
will be clearer.62 A testifying expert whose report cites all TPI
that was requested, obtained, and not obtained can more effec-
tively respond to challenges on cross-examination that his or
her opinion is biased or deficient due to an inadequate review
of the available evidence.63 In addition, experts who attribute
information to sources throughout their reports and who use
frequent quotations will be better able to describe the specific
details of their evaluations if they are later called to testify.64
LIMITATIONS OF TPI AND APPROACHES TO DEALING
WITH SUCH CHALLENGES
Despite the importance of TPI in FMHA, there are numerous
challenges to its use. Potential difficulties include practical and
legal barriers to accessing records and problems interviewing
collateral informants—including difficulty establishing contact
or refusal to participate.65 Once records are obtained or willing
collateral informants are reached, numerous additional influ-
ences may limit TPI reliability. Issues such as bias, incomplete
knowledge and limited memory, lack of understanding about
what is important, and suggestibility may all limit the accuracy
of TPI.66 Illegibility is an additional potential problem with
physical records and documents.67 Scientific research findings
(almost always in the form of “nomothetic” or group data),
which a forensic clinician may incorporate in his or her evalu-
ation, are limited to some extent in their relevance or applica-
bility.68 The rationale, methods, and interpretation of research
can always be critiqued for relevance, applicability, or design.69
Additionally, data from scientific studies—or from technical
manuals that accompany psychological tests—are rarely
included in FMHA reports, although the forensic clinician does
consider this information in reaching opinions.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
In recognition of professional confidentiality and legal-priv-
ilege considerations, forensic evaluators generally request all
relevant TPI through the retaining or appointing party, typi-
cally the attorney or the court.70 If retained, forensic clinicians
ask the appropriate attorney to use appropriate legal proce-
dures to obtain requested TPI (e.g., legal authorizations for
release, depositions, interrogatories, requests for production,
court orders, protective orders, permissions to contact collat-
eral informants) and to handle any legal disputes that may
arise over access issues.71 Evaluators appointed by court order
typically have more discretion to obtain TPI on their own ini-
tiative, particularly when obtaining such TPI is specified in the
court order. Still, there are times when it will be prudent for a
court-appointed forensic clinician to notify the attorneys in the
case about the TPI to be collected.72
Familiarity with the records commonly available for review
in various types of FMHA (e.g., police, court, probation,
school, medical, and mental-health records) helps forensic
evaluators identify what might be available and recognize
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when certain records may be missing. When a retaining exam-
inee or counsel blocks access to records, he or she should be
advised that the validity of the FMHA is correspondingly lim-
ited.73 If the withholding is significant, the forensic clinician
may need to withdraw from the assignment due to his or her
inability to complete an adequate evaluation without the
undisclosed information.74
Best practices dictate that forensic evaluators consider the
source and quality of all obtained records, noting when docu-
ments include illegible, incomplete, or possibly biased or oth-
erwise inaccurate information, and communicating anything
relevant to the integrity of reviewed materials.75 Forensic clin-
icians then incorporate documentary data carefully in their
reports, including relevant information from such sources and
summarizing such content in a systematic, impartial, and com-
prehensible manner. This is accomplished in part by listing all
information that was requested and which sources actually
were obtained and reviewed, attributing all data to its source(s)
and noting consistent and inconsistent information across
sources, quoting sources verbatim, and aiming for concise-
ness.76
In third-party interviews, forensic evaluators address poten-
tial problems by being persistent, open, respectful, flexible,
inquisitive, and judicious. When retained by one party, foren-
sic psychologists do not seek to contact the opposing party or
his or her counsel without the appropriate permission.77 To
increase the chances of establishing contact with a collateral
informant, forensic clinicians can ask retaining counsel, the
examinee, and other collateral informants for as much contact
information as is known about this third party (e.g., phone
numbers, e-mail addresses) and for advice about how best to
reach the collateral informant (e.g., what day of the week, what
time of the day). 
If multiple attempts to contact a third party prove unsuc-
cessful, forensic evaluators must decide whether to make con-
tinued efforts. If the collateral informant is expected to have
important and relevant information about the examinee, a
forensic clinician can report the problem to the retaining attor-
ney or appointing judge and request that the legal professional
try to make contact with the third party to explain the impor-
tance of the interview, schedule an informal interview, or
obtain or issue a subpoena or court order. If other obtained
collateral sources of information make the specific third-party
interview less critical, however, the forensic evaluator might
simply document in the report that contact efforts were unsuc-
cessful and note how the missing information was wholly or
partially offset by other available data. Similarly, when appre-
hensive third parties decline to be interviewed after the foren-
sic clinician makes the request and provides a notification of
purpose, that decision should be respected.78 They should not
attempt to persuade potential collateral informants—particu-
larly since reluctance may stem from a wish to avoid being
specifically identified, and descriptions of collateral interviews
must identify informants and attribute their information to
them specifically.79 Instead, forensic clinicians again should
document refusals in the report and indicate any resultant cau-
tion readers should exercise in making judgments based on the
report. Experts should also note in their reports that appropri-
ate notification procedures were utilized.80
Even if third parties can be reached, their schedules may
make it difficult for them to be interviewed at all, for more
than a brief period of time, or without interruption. This may
require the forensic evaluator to conduct a more limited inter-
view than would be ideal, to divide the interview into multiple
sessions, or to conduct the interview under less than optimal
circumstances (e.g., while the third party is within hearing dis-
tance of dependents or other persons). Forensic clinicians
dealing with such challenges should prioritize their questions
to collect the most essential information from the time-limited
informant. They should break up the interview into different
time periods when necessary and when convenient for the
informant (including during early mornings, later evenings,
and weekends). They must consider whether the circum-
stances (including distractions or the presence of other par-
ties) would invalidate any attempted interview or risk the
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. When any
interview is conducted, the evaluator must subsequently
decide whether it was of sufficient quality, relevance, and trust-
worthiness to be considered and reported. Interview condi-
tions should be noted in the evaluator’s report.
Forensic clinicians remain alert for bias, limited knowledge,
or irrelevance among collateral informants.81 Family members,
friends, and victims, among those frequently interviewed,
might tend to selectively or inaccurately report, omit, or char-
acterize information in an attempt to benefit or harm the
examinee or his or her case. Collateral informants might have
had limited contact with the examinee or only had contact in
certain contexts. As such, they may only have partial or incom-
plete knowledge about an examinee’s present or past behavior,
relationships, and other relevant domains. 
Forensic evaluators use follow-up questioning to appraise
the quality of a collateral informant’s familiarity with the exam-
inee: their closeness, the nature of their contact, and the pres-
ence of limitations such as bias or memory loss.82 Eliciting the
collateral informant’s perceptions about the examinee’s situa-
tion and circumstances, particularly through asking how the
third party would like to see the case concluded, can yield
clues about bias.83 Comparing the consistency of information
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from a collateral informant with information obtained from
other sources provides another potential indicator of accu-
racy.84 Accordingly, recommended practice involves interview-
ing multiple collateral informants and highlighting trends
across interviewees rather than information reported solely by
a single informant.85 Selection of third-party informants pro-
motes optimal information when subsequent informants are
chosen because they know the most about domains for which
earlier informants knew least.86 Forensic clinicians report
information from third-party informants as they report
records, including clarifying uncorroborated information, to
facilitate the reader’s own assessment of the quality of the
informational sources.87
In addition to potential bias or lack of recent close contact,
collateral informants should not convey conclusions.88 Their
observations, rather than judgments or conclusions, are
needed.89 To focus collateral informants, forensic evaluators
can use guided questioning, moving from the general to the
specific, while refraining from overly suggestive questioning.
Avoiding suggestion is particularly important with collateral
informants who do not provide detailed responses to initial
questions and hence need more specific follow-up inquiries.90
Earlier descriptions in response to general and broad ques-
tions can be compared against later responses to more specific
questions.91 The level of detail in response to an evaluator’s
questions is one indication of a collateral informant’s relevant
knowledge.92 A forensic clinician can follow up with a third
party if subsequently collected information yields discrepan-
cies; such an iterative evaluation process reflects how different
sources of data add to the picture compiled over time. In decid-
ing how to convey information obtained from collateral infor-
mants, forensic evaluators consider the sensitive nature of
much of this information, describing it as much as possible
without hyperbole and in a style designed to limit unnecessary
inflammatory impact. 
A collateral informant’s own cognitive and mental-health
functioning (e.g., apparent or reported low intelligence,
acknowledged or documented memory impairment, interper-
sonal anxiety, substance intoxication) might affect the nature
of the information that is provided and may require the foren-
sic clinician to adjust the interviewing style.93 Forensic evalu-
ators are especially careful about avoiding suggestion when
interviewing third parties with some form of impairment or
who have witnessed events under circumstances that may have
affected the accuracy of their perception or encoding of the
event (e.g., extreme and distressing events, cross-racial obser-
vations).94 The style and substance of questioning should be
adapted to the collateral informant’s personal characteristics.95
Forensic clinicians can utilize differing levels of concreteness
or abstraction in their questions or disclose non-sensitive
details (e.g., alleged date and time, documented weather con-
ditions—but not behavior that is part of the alleged offense) to
help an interviewee focus on the time in question.96 Regarding
the substance of questioning, forensic clinicians may opt to
only question a collateral informant about topics with which
the collateral informant is well informed. Any adjustments
made to an interview based on personal characteristics of a col-
lateral informant should be noted in the forensic evaluator’s
report.
LEGAL STATUS OF TPI
Although forensic clinicians may recognize the importance
of TPI, legal professionals will recognize that TPI often consti-
tutes hearsay evidence, which is generally inadmissible.97
Thus, legal professionals may have concerns about using TPI,
given the law’s preference for evidence that can be subjected to
accuracy-testing procedures such as cross-examination; that is
collected via generally accepted techniques; and that was orig-
inally obtained consistent with Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment requirements.98 The fields of forensic psychology
and forensic psychiatry are clear, however, that TPI
“enhanc[es] the integrity of the process, the impartiality of the
evaluator, and the weight given the results by the trier of
fact.”99 This view is consistent with that of the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Federal Rules of Evidence:
The rationale . . . is that the expert is fully capable of
judging for himself what is, or is not, a reliable basis for
his opinion . . . [b]ecause of his professional background,
knowledge, and experience. . . . [T]he expert [knows
how] to separate the wheat from the chaff and to use only
those sources and kinds of information which are of a
type reasonably relied upon by similar experts in arriving
at sound opinions on the subject. . . . Upon admission of
such evidence . . . the court . . . [will] instruct the jury
that the hearsay evidence [and other inadmissible evi-
dence] is to be considered solely as a basis for the expert
opinion and not as substantive evidence.100
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The relevant federal and state standards will be described in
the following sections. These standards are summarized in
Table 3.
LEGAL STATUS IN THE FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Experts providing testimony in federal court are governed
by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 703 allows experts to
present opinions based on information of which they have
“been made aware” before trial—for example, via third par-
ties.101 In this way, expert witnesses are distinguished from lay
witnesses, who are typically restricted to testifying about their
personal observations to avoid conveying out-of-court infor-
mation in violation of hearsay rules.102 According to this Rule,
expert opinions based on such out-of-court information may
be admitted, even if those facts or data underlying the opinion
would be inadmissible, as long as other experts in the field
would reasonably rely on the same type of information.103
This aspect of Rule 703 has not changed substantially since
the development of the Federal Rules of Evidence 40 years
ago, at a time when common-law rules of evidence were far
more limiting to experts.104 Developers of Federal Rule 703
sought to allow for experts to engage in their standard prac-
tices, most notably the practice of relying on outside informa-
tion to make informed conclusions, without burdening courts
by requiring that all such information be admitted into evi-
dence.105
Following the creation of Rule 703, expert-opinion testi-
mony could no longer be excluded from federal court solely
because it was based on inadmissible evidence (e.g., third-
party information and other hearsay). Instead, judges would
first need to determine whether other experts in the relevant
field would reasonably rely on the same kind of facts and
data.106 Some scholars described reasonable reliance as a “low
threshold,”107 with many courts inclined to accept an expert’s
assertion that such information was reasonably relied upon.108
However, several other courts interpreted the rule as requiring
judges to evaluate the “trustworthiness” of the underlying facts
or data before deciding if it was reasonably relied upon.109 If a
judge determined that the expert relied on untrustworthy
information to form his or her opinion, that reliance became
inherently unreasonable, and the expert’s opinion would be
excluded under Rule 703.110 In this way, judges used the added
trustworthiness component to avoid entirely abdicating their
gatekeeper role to experts—and provide additional protection
against lawyers using experts to bypass evidentiary restric-
tions.111
Although the original version of Rule 703 indicated that
experts may share their opinions—even if they are based on
inadmissible evidence—through testimony, experts are also
expected to describe how they formed their opinions and what
information they considered in reaching them.112 However, the
initial iteration of Rule 703 did not indicate what restrictions
should apply to an expert’s testimonial discussion of the inad-
missible facts or data underlying an opinion. As a result, schol-
arly debates emerged and circuits split.113 Few courts inter-
preted Rule 703 as allowing the effectively unrestricted admis-
sion of such inadmissible information via expert testimony
because of its use as the basis for an opinion, often viewing the
rule as another hearsay exception.114 More commonly, federal
courts permitted the introduction of inadmissible background
information for the limited purpose of explaining how an
expert formulated his or her opinion, not as statements of
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TABLE 3
FEDERAL AND STATE RULES RELATED TO THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RELIED UPON BY EXPERT WITNESSES
JURISDICTION CATEGORY
RELEVANT RULE
OR CASE
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULE OR CASE
Federal Rule
Post-
amendment 
FRE
Fed. R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware
of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds
of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion
to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the
opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate
the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Alabama
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Ala. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may
be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference
to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by
the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value
in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial
effect.
Alaska
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Alaska R. Evid. 
703; 705(c)
703: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. Facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence, but must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.
705(c): When the underlying facts or data would be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
other than to explain or support the expert’s opinion or inference, the court shall exclude the
underlying facts or data if the danger that they will be used for an improper purpose outweighs
their value as support for the expert’s opinion. If the facts or data are disclosed before the jury, a
limiting instruction by the court shall be given upon request.
Arizona
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Ariz. R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware
of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds
of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion
to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the
opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate
the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Arkansas
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Ark. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may
be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,
the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
California
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Other 
Cal. Evid. 
Code §§ 
801, 804
801: If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to
such an opinion as is: (a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience
that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact; and (b) Based on matter (including
his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) perceived by or personally
known to the witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissi-
ble, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon
the subject to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such
matter as a basis for his opinion.
804: (a) If a witness testifying as an expert testifies that his opinion is based in whole or in part
upon the opinion or statement of another person, such other person may be called and examined
by any adverse party as if under cross-examination concerning the opinion or statement.
(b) This section is not applicable if the person upon whose opinion or statement the expert wit-
ness has relied is (1) a party, (2) a person identified with a party within the meaning of subdivi-
sion (d) of Section 776, or (3) a witness who has testified in the action concerning the subject
matter of the opinion or statement upon which the expert witness has relied.
(c) Nothing in this section makes admissible an expert opinion that is inadmissible because it is
based in whole or in part on the opinion or statement of another person.
(d) An expert opinion otherwise admissible is not made inadmissible by this section because it is
based on the opinion or statement of a person who is unavailable for examination pursuant to
this section.
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the truth of the information within the reports); Bauman v. Cen-
tex Corp., 611 F.2d 1115, 1120 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding error with trial
court’s decision to exclude psychological testimony until after
defendant had testified “because there is no requirement that the
opinion be based on the evidence at trial”).
116. See, e.g., Paddack, 745 F.2d at 1262.
117. Such rules include the balancing test in FED. R. EVID. 403 and
the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Const. amend, 6. See Bar-
rel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028,
1033 (5th Cir. 1984); Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21
F.3d 721, 728-29 (6th Cir. 1994); Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1270 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1981).
118. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note.
119. Id.
120. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
121. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 3 (2004).
122. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
123. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note.
124. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
125. Id. at 2228.
126. Id. at 2238.
127. Id. at 2243.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2259.
130. Id.
131. See infra Table 3 for a list of relevant state statutes and caselaw.
fact.115 Often such opinions suggested that judges should
instruct jurors that otherwise inadmissible information should
be used solely to help them evaluate the expert’s opinion and
not as substantive evidence in the case.116 Finally, other courts
explicitly recognized that whereas an expert’s testimony about
the bases of his or her opinions might be admissible under
Rule 703, such admission might still conflict with other evi-
dentiary and constitutional rules—and therefore should be
prohibited.117
In response to the circuits’ split over whether experts should
be allowed to disclose the underlying bases for their opinions if
they include inadmissible evidence, Rule 703 was amended in
2000.118 The amended rule seemed to align with those circuits
that explicitly referenced the potential for Rule 703 to be super-
seded by Rule 403, mandating that inadmissible information
not be disclosed to the jury unless the court finds that its pro-
bative value in helping the factfinder evaluate the expert’s opin-
ion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.119
Since the 2000 amendment to Rule 703, there have been
several noteworthy U.S. Supreme Court decisions relevant to
the introduction of third-party information. In Crawford v.
Washington,120 the United States Supreme Court held that any
testimonial out-of-court statements are barred unless the wit-
ness is currently unavailable but had previously been available
for the defendant to cross-examine. The Court related this
requirement to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,
granting defendants the right to confront their accusers regard-
less of whether the court deemed the information reliable. This
interpretation was a departure from the previous Supreme
Court decision in Ohio v. Roberts,121 which described several
exceptions to the hearsay clause that were eschewed under
Crawford.
One of the residual questions not addressed in Crawford was
the nature of “testimonial” evidence. This was addressed by the
Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,122 where the Court defined
a document developed for evidentiary purposes, in this case a
blood-alcohol-analysis report, as “testimonial” under the mean-
ing of the Confrontation Clause. The document was therefore
excluded, despite the Court’s recognition of its reliability. How-
ever, Rule 703 itself did not seem to change in response to these
Supreme Court rulings; other than a slight modification in con-
junction with a rules-wide restyling in 2011, it has remained
substantively the same since the addition of the balancing test
weighing probative value and prejudicial effect.123
Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Williams v. Illinois,124 holding that testimony need not be
accusatory—and can even be impartial and scientific—to be
covered under the Crawford reading of the Confrontation
Clause.125 The Court added that the Confrontation Clause
does not prohibit irrelevant evidence from being admitted as
part of expert testimony, identifying testimonial statements
that are unavailable for cross-examination as the central issue
of previous cases.126 The Court instructed trial judges to con-
sider the purpose that a reasonable person would attribute to
the statement in question to determine whether facts or data
underlying an expert’s opinion are prohibited by the Con-
frontation Clause.127
In Williams, the Court noted that the DNA profile in ques-
tion was used to apprehend a suspect but not to obtain evi-
dence against a defendant; therefore, the profile did not vio-
late the Confrontation Clause.128 Justice Thomas concurred in
judgment, stating that “[i]t is no answer to say that ‘safe-
guards’ in the rules of evidence will prevent the abuse of basis
testimony” and that the “balancing test is no substitute for a
constitutional provision that has already struck the balance in
favor of the accused.”129 Justice Thomas also observed that
reputable experts within the mental-health field frequently
rely upon third-party information that would qualify as
hearsay.130
LEGAL STATUS IN STATE JURISDICTIONS
State jurisdictions can create their own rules regarding
third-party information. Many have implemented—via statute
or caselaw—rules similar to a previous or current version of
Federal Rule 703, while others have created their own rules
governing this type of evidence.131
STATE RULES SIMILAR TO PRE-AMENDMENT VERSION
OF FRE 703 
Statutes or caselaw from 19 states appear to apply a TPI-
related rule that is substantively similar to the original iteration
of Federal Rule 703 (before the amendment in 2000 that added
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FEDERAL AND STATE RULES RELATED TO THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RELIED UPON BY EXPERT WITNESSES
JURISDICTION CATEGORY
RELEVANT RULE
OR CASE
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULE OR CASE
Colorado
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Colo. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion
or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be dis-
closed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Connecticut
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Other 
Conn. Code Evid. 
§ 7-4(b)
(b) Bases of opinion testimony by experts. The facts in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the proceeding. The facts need not be admissible in evidence if of a type customarily relied on
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions on the subject. The facts relied on pur-
suant to this subsection are not substantive evidence, unless otherwise admissible as such evi-
dence.
Delaware
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
(however,
Delaware
requires party
who wants to
exclude
expert-basis
information
from the jury
to raise the
issue by
objection)
Del. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or infer-
ence to be admitted. Upon objection, facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Florida
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 90.704
The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived
by, or made known to, the expert at or before the trial. If the facts or data are of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the subject to support the opinion expressed, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible may not be
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Georgia
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Ga. Code Ann.
§ 24-7-703
The facts or data in the particular proceeding upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, such facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opin-
ion or inference to be admitted. Such facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Hawaii
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Adds trust-
worthiness
component 
Haw. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. The court may, how-
ever, disallow testimony in the form of an opinion or inference if the underlying facts or data
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Idaho
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Idaho R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion
or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be dis-
closed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.
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132. These states include Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming. Of note, Louisiana
maintains different standards for the civil and criminal context;
although the civil-court rule mimics the pre-amendment version
of Rule 703 verbatim, the state’s criminal courts only allow an
expert to discuss inadmissible information during cross-exami-
nation. See LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 705.
133. FED. R. EVID. 703, 705. Illinois and Indiana serve as other, some-
what less concrete examples, as both states created/amended
their relevant rules after the 2011 restyling of the federal rules
and still chose not to include the balancing test. See ILL. R. EVID.
703; IND. R. EVID. 703.
134. See supra p. 24, 26 for a discussion of this distinction.
135. Meins v. Meins, 93 Ark. App. 292, 301, 218 S.W.3d 366, 368,
371 (2005).
136. Id. (quoting Lawhon v. Ayres Corp., 67 Ark. App. 66, 992 S.W.2d
162 (1999)). See also Miller v. State, 2010 Ark. 1, 27, 362 S.W.3d
264, 281-82 (2010) (permissible for trial court to allow psy-
chologist to testify as to defendant’s prior acts of violence to
explain “critical” background information used during his
forensic evaluation of defendant). But see Bowen v. State, 322
Ark. 483, 514-15, 911 S.W.2d 555, 570-71 (1995) (permissible
for trial court to deny expert reading a psychosocial history of
defendant based on interviews with third parties because the
“only purpose for offering the statements . . . was for the truth
of the matter asserted”).
137. See State v. Hayden, 233 Neb. 211, 215, 444 N.W.2d 317, 321
(1989) (“We conclude that the statements complained of were
admitted as foundation for Dr. Woytassek’s diagnosis and opin-
ion that defendant was mentally ill and dangerous.”); State v.
Simants, 248 Neb. 581, 586, 537 N.W.2d 346, 350 (1995)
(“Because the State’s exhibits were not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted therein, but instead were relied upon to provide
a basis for expert testimony pursuant to rule 703, the district
court did not err by admitting the exhibits into evidence.”).
138. See State v. Hayden, 237 Neb. 286, 466 N.W.2d 66 (1991).
139. ALA R. EVID. 703.
140. N.M.R. EVID. 11-703.
141. E.g., State v. Smith, 215 Ariz. 221, 159 P.3d 531 (2007); State v.
Lundstrom, 161 Ariz. 141, 776 P.2d 1067 (1989).
142. Vega v. State Farm Mut. Auto., 45 So. 3d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
143. DEL. R. EVID. 703.
144. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-458.
the “probative value vs. prejudicial effect” balancing test).132
Some of these states may have simply failed to update their
statutes in accordance with the changing federal rule, but oth-
ers appear to have intentionally implemented a rule that omits
the balancing test. For example, the Pennsylvania rule’s advi-
sory-committee notes indicate that the state deliberately did
not include such a balancing test in its statute because it con-
flicts with another rule of evidence in Pennsylvania, requiring
that facts and data underlying an expert’s opinion be disclosed
to the trier of fact.133 However, the omission of a balancing test
that instructs judges how to decide whether to admit testi-
mony about inadmissible evidence underlying an expert’s
opinion necessarily results in some ambiguity regarding how
to resolve such a question. As a result, many of these states
apply their relevant evidentiary rules in a manner similar to the
federal jurisdiction—before the amendment of Rule 703—that
permitted an expert to testify regarding inadmissible back-
ground information for the limited purpose of explaining how
he or she formulated an opinion, and not as a statement of
fact.134
For example, an Arkansas Court of Appeals case affirmed
the decision to allow a social worker to present information
disclosed to her during her treatment of children involved in a
custody dispute that, if true, reflected negatively on one of the
parties.135 The court explained its decision, reasoning that the
children’s statements to the social worker contributed to the
formation of her expert opinion and that “an expert must be
allowed to disclose to the trier of fact the basis of facts for his
opinion, as otherwise the opinion is left unsupported in midair
with little if any means for evaluating its correctness.”136 Addi-
tionally, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that, during
commitment proceedings, mental-health professionals may
include the results of interviews and examinations performed
by others—in addition to other forms of TPI—in their reports
when such information provides the basis for an expert’s opin-
ion.137 By extension, the court has also prohibited the inclu-
sion of such inadmissible information when submitted to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.138
STATE RULE SIMILAR TO POST-AMENDMENT VERSION
OF FRE 703 
Several states have rules of evidence that are substantively
similar to the current version of FRE 703. It appears that 18
states have such rules: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Although these state statutes vary
slightly in their wording, the requirements and restrictions on
otherwise inadmissible facts or data are similar to the post-
amended version of FRE 703. For example, Alabama’s139 and
New Mexico’s140 relevant rules of evidence prohibit otherwise
inadmissible evidence unless the court determines that the
probative value in assisting the fact-finder to evaluate the
expert’s opinion substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect
of the evidence. After decades of steadfastly adhering to the
common-law standard, Alabama’s statute was recently changed
to mirror the post-amendment version of Federal Rule 703. A
brief review of the relevant caselaw indicates that Arizona per-
mits experts to testify as to previous reports or medical opin-
ions that contributed to the formulating of their own opin-
ions.141 Florida has also held that experts are entitled to rely on
hearsay evidence when forming their opinions on issues rele-
vant to a case.142
Some states include all of the relevant parts of FRE 703 but
add additional qualifiers or requirements. For example,
Delaware requires an objection to invoke the prevention of
inadmissible evidence as outlined in FRE 703.143 Additionally,
the relevant statute in Kansas was recently amended to add the
restrictions for otherwise inadmissible evidence.144 These
amendments are effective as of July 1, 2014. It should be noted
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JURISDICTION CATEGORY
RELEVANT RULE
OR CASE
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULE OR CASE
Illinois
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Ill. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Indiana
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Ind. R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made
aware of or personally observed. Experts may testify to opinions based on inadmissible evi-
dence, provided that it is of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.
Iowa
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Iowa Code Ann.
R. 5.703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the trial or hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Kansas
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-458
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert. If of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible into evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be
admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by
the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that the probative
value of such facts or data in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs any prejudicial effect.
Kentucky
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Adds trust-
worthiness 
component 
Ky. R. Evid. 
703
(a) The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer-
ences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
(b) If determined to be trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and unprivileged, facts
or data relied upon by an expert pursuant to subdivision (a) may at the discretion of the court
be disclosed to the jury even though such facts or data are not admissible in evidence. Upon
request the court shall admonish the jury to use such facts or data only for the purpose of
evaluating the validity and probative value of the expert’s opinion or inference.
Louisiana
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
La. Code Evid.
Ann. art. 703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Maine
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Me. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Maryland
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Adds trust-
worthiness 
component 
Md. R. Evid. 
5-703
(a) In General. The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
(b) Disclosure to Jury. If determined to be trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and
unprivileged, facts or data reasonably relied upon by an expert pursuant to section (a) may, in
the discretion of the court, be disclosed to the jury even if those facts and data are not admissi-
ble in evidence. Upon request, the court shall instruct the jury to use those facts and data only
for the purpose of evaluating the validity and probative value of the expert’s opinion or infer-
ence.
Massachusetts
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Experts can
only rely on
admissible
evidence
Com. v. 
Markvart, 437
Mass. 331, 337,
771 N.E.2d 778,
783 (2002)
Qualified examiners, as expert witnesses, may base their opinions on (1) facts personally
observed; (2) evidence already in the records or which the parties represent will be admitted
during the course of the proceedings, assumed to be true in questions put to the expert wit-
nesses; and (3) “facts or data not in evidence if the facts or data are independently admissible and
are a permissible basis for an expert to consider in formulating an opinion.”
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145. The Oklahoma statute was briefly invalidated for violation of the
Oklahoma Constitution’s single-subject bill. See Douglas v. Cox
Retirement Properties, Inc., 302 P.3d 789 (Okla. 2013). But the
Oklahoma Legislature reenacted the provision, 12 Okla. Stat.
Ann. § 2703, later in 2013. See 2013 Okla. Sess. Laws, 1st Extra-
ordinary Sess., chapter 15, §§ 5, 6.
146. Those states include Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, and Ten-
nessee. 
147. HAW. R. EVID. 703.
148. TENN. R. EVID. 703.
149. HAW. R. EVID. 703; TENN. R. EVID. 703. However, Hawaii’s statute
indicates that a judge may disallow such testimony, while Ten-
nessee’s statute notes that a judge shall disallow such testimony.
Id.
150. KY. R. EVID. 703.
151. MD. R. EVID. 5-703. 
152. KY. R. EVID. 703.; MD. R. EVID. 5-703.
153. State v. Scott, 275 S.W.3d 395, 409-10 (Tenn. 2009).
154. Rabovsky v. Com., 973 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Ky. 1998). As discussed
supra, judges in Kentucky state courts may only allow experts to
disclose inadmissible facts or data underlying their opinions if
those data are “determined to be trustworthy, necessary to illu-
minate testimony, and unprivileged.” KY. R. EVID. 703.
155. These states include Massachusetts, Michigan, and Ohio. Addi-
tionally, as discussed infra, Virginia limits the bases of expert
opinions in criminal cases to “facts personally known or
observed by the expert, or based upon facts in evidence.” VA.
SUP. CT. R. 2:703(b). In civil cases, however, the applicable rule
tracks the pre-2000-amendment version of Federal Rule 703. VA.
SUP. CT. R. 2:703(a).
156. OHIO R. EVID. 703.
157. State v. Solomon, 59 Ohio St. 3d 124, 126, 570 N.E.2d 1118,
1120 (1991) (holding that mental-health professionals may
review non-admitted police reports and hospital records when
formulating their opinions and still testify in accordance with
Rule 703); see also Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 2005-Ohio-
4787, 106 Ohio St. 3d 237, 240, 834 N.E.2d 323, 327 (“we have
acknowledged that information that would not be admissible at
trial may serve as a basis for an expert’s background knowledge
without violating Evid.R. 703.”).
158. MICH. R. EVID. 703. For example, the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan noted that a trial court could properly exclude a psycholo-
gist’s testimony that was based, in large part, on inadmissible
hearsay statements from the defendant. People v. Yost, 483 Mich.
856, 759 N.W.2d 196 (2009).
159. Com. v. Markvart, 437 Mass. 331, 337, 771 N.E.2d 778, 783
(2002).
160. See Com. v. Jaime, 433 Mass. 575, 577, 745 N.E.2d 320, 322
(2001).
161. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 801, 804.
that one of the rules of evidence that strongly resembles the
FRE is that in Oklahoma.145
STATE RULE DISTINCT FROM FRE: ADDING TRUST-
WORTHINESS COMPONENT 
Four states have explicitly included some form of a trust-
worthiness component in their versions of the evidentiary
rule.146 Specifically, rules in Hawaii147 and Tennessee148 note
that a court has the power to prohibit opinion testimony “if the
underlying facts or data indicate lack of trustworthiness.”149
Additionally, relevant rules from both Kentucky150 and Mary-
land151 require that typically inadmissible underlying facts be
“trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and unprivi-
leged” before experts can disclose them to the jury.152 Indicat-
ing how a court might identify untrustworthy supporting data,
the Tennessee Supreme Court noted:  
A foundation built upon facts contrary to known
undisputed facts, facts that do not adequately support the
conclusion, or assumptions that neither reasonably arise
from an expert’s expertise or inferences that can reason-
ably be drawn from the evidence are examples of failings
that would render the facts relied upon by an expert
insufficiently trustworthy.153
Additionally, application of the trustworthiness component
of Kentucky’s rule resulted in that state’s supreme court over-
turning a murder conviction, holding that the trial court
should not have allowed an expert to read from inadmissible
medical records without first addressing the three factual
determinations required by the state evidentiary rule.154
STATE RULE DISTINCT FROM FRE: EXPERTS CAN ONLY
RELY ON ADMITTED OR ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
Harkening back to the days before the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, three states utilize statutes or caselaw prohibiting opin-
ions based on inadmissible and/or non-admitted evidence alto-
gether.155 Specifically, Ohio limits the basis of expert testimony
to include only those facts and data that the expert personally
perceived or are admitted into evidence.156 However, Ohio
courts seem to apply a somewhat liberal definition of “person-
ally perceived,” allowing experts to base their opinions on
background knowledge (i.e., via professional articles) and doc-
uments like police reports and medical records despite the fact
that they are not admitted into evidence.157 Similarly, Michigan
prohibits experts from basing their opinions on any facts or
data that are not, or will not be, admitted into evidence.158
Finally, although Massachusetts has not codified its rules of
evidence, its caselaw indicates that expert witnesses may only
base their opinions on personal observations; evidence that has
been, or will be, admitted; and “facts or data not in evidence if
the facts or data are independently admissible and are a per-
missible basis for an expert to consider in formulating an opin-
ion.”159 Massachusetts also limits discussion of these underly-
ing facts to cross-examination, rather than allowing presenta-
tion during the expert’s direct examination.160
STATE RULE DISTINCT FROM FRE: OTHER 
There are six states that appear to depart significantly from
the standards articulated in FRE 703: California, Connecticut,
Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, and Virginia. California’s
statute includes both the information found in FRE 702, which
describes the relevant requirements of expert testimony, and
that which is found in FRE 703.161 Notably, the California rule
differs substantially from both FRE 703 and other states’ evi-
dence rules in stating that although otherwise admissible
expert opinions are not made inadmissible because they are
based on hearsay evidence, nothing in the section makes an
expert opinion admissible where it would be inadmissible
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Michigan
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Experts can only
rely on admissi-
ble 
evidence
Mich. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
shall be in evidence. This rule does not restrict the discretion of the court to receive expert
opinion testimony subject to the condition that the factual bases of the opinion be admitted in
evidence hereafter.
Minnesota
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Other
Minn. R. Evid. 
703
(a) The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer-
ences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
(b) Underlying expert data must be independently admissible in order to be received upon
direct examination; provided that when good cause is shown in civil cases and the underlying
data is particularly trustworthy, the court may admit the data under this rule for the limited
purpose of showing the basis for the expert’s opinion. Nothing in this rule restricts admissibil-
ity of underlying expert data when inquired into on cross-examination.
Mississippi
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Miss. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Missouri
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
State v. 
Woodworth, 
941 S.W.2d 679
(Mo. Ct. App.
W.D. 1997)
“An expert witness is entitled to rely on hearsay evidence to support an opinion so long as
that evidence is of the type reasonably relied upon by other experts in that field, and such evi-
dence need not be independently admissible. Any expert witness represents the distillation of
the total of his personal experiences, readings, studies and learning in his field of expertise,
and he may rely on that background, hearsay or not, as basis for his opinion” (internal cita-
tions and quotations omitted).
Montana
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Mont. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may
be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type rea-
sonably relied upon by experts in a particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Nebraska
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 27-703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Nevada
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 50.285
1. The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
2. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
New 
Hampshire
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
N.H.R. Evid. 
5-703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
New Jersey
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
N.J.R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
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162. Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc., 2 Cal. App. 4th 1516, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d
833 (1992); People v. Geier, 41 Cal. 4th 555, 161 P.3d 104
(2007).
163. CONN. CODE EVID. § 7-4(b).
164. Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994).
165. MINN. R. EVID. 703.
166. MINN. R. EVID. 703, Supreme Court Advisory Notes. 
167. People v. Goldstein, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 843 N.E.2d 727 (2005).
168. People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 323 N.E.2d 169 (1974).
169. R.I. R. EVID. 703.
170. E.g., State v. Brown, 88 A.3d 1101 (R.I. 2014).
171. See State v. Huffman, 68 A.3d 558 (R.I. 2013).
172. VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:703.
173. VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:705(a).
174. Id.
because it is based in whole or in part on the opinion or state-
ment of another person. Based on existing caselaw, it appears
that reliability of the inadmissible evidence is a significant fac-
tor in determining whether the expert testimony using it is
admissible.162
Connecticut requires that the facts underlying an expert’s
opinion be a type customarily relied on by experts in a partic-
ular field in order to be introduced when otherwise inadmissi-
ble.163 Connecticut additionally distinguishes between those
facts relied upon for expert testimony and substantive evi-
dence unless that information relied upon may also be admis-
sible. Unlike FRE 703, Connecticut’s statute does not include
a balancing test weighing the prejudicial impact of the evi-
dence against its probative value. Similar to California caselaw,
Connecticut courts have interpreted the statute to require that
experts disclose the facts underlying their opinions before they
may render the opinion itself.164
Minnesota’s statute closely resembles the pre-2000 FRE 703
but differs in distinguishing information admissible on direct
examination versus cross-examination.165 While underlying
expert data must be admissible on its own to be introduced on
direct examination, the statute explicitly states that the rule
does not restrict the admissibility of underlying data when this
information is challenged on cross-examination. If the expert
can show the underlying information to be particularly trust-
worthy, then the rule does permit evidence to be introduced for
a limited purpose. The issue of trustworthiness is left to the
presiding judge, who must be satisfied that the information
relied upon by the expert is sufficiently reliable to ensure the
validity of the expert’s opinion.166
Unlike other states, New York does not have a particular
statute addressing the issue of third-party information in
expert testimony. The state also diverges from other states in its
strict adherence to Confrontation Clause principles and its
holding that even when hearsay evidence is reliable, it remains
inadmissible when the defendant is denied the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant.167 This holding does not appear
to prohibit experts from relying on third-party information but
only from relaying that information to the court—based upon
established precedent permitting this reliance.168 However, it
should be noted that Goldstein was decided after the United
States Supreme Court’s landmark case of Crawford v. Washing-
ton. Therefore, Goldstein may be considered the progeny of
Crawford and may reflect a revised approach to third-party
information in the context of expert evidence. 
Under Rhode Island’s rules of evidence, any facts or data rea-
sonably and customarily relied upon by experts are admissible
even without testimony from the declarant.169 Although the
rule itself does not require a balancing test, some state cases
have nonetheless examined the probative value versus the prej-
udicial impact of the evidence.170 This appears to be particularly
applicable when the expert relied upon an alleged victim’s
reports—and the expert’s reliance upon the victim may be inter-
preted as an implicit affirmation of the victim’s credibility.171
Although most state rules of evidence have language applic-
able to both criminal and civil law, Virginia explicitly distin-
guishes between the two.172 While the Virginia statute notes
that evidence of a type typically relied upon by other experts
in a particular field need not be admissible on its own in civil
contexts, it does not have parallel language in criminal cases.
Rather, evidence relied upon in a criminal case should be
either personally known or observed by the expert or inde-
pendently introduced into evidence. Virginia also has a statute
related specifically to disclosure of facts or data utilized in
expert testimony, and this rule also distinguishes between the
requirements in civil cases versus criminal cases.173 Although
the statute requires that facts relied upon by the expert be dis-
closed in a criminal case, there is no such requirement in the
civil context unless specifically ordered by the court or elicited
upon cross-examination.174
CONCLUSION
The use of third-party information in FMHA appears
strongly supported within the fields of forensic psychology and
forensic psychiatry. Among other contributions, the incorpora-
tion of third-party information helps to promote overall accu-
racy, detect bias from other sources, enhance impartiality, and
increase credibility. But the relevant law on the admissibility of
such third-party information as part of expert evaluations on
criminal, civil, and family-law matters varies considerably.
Before the revision of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 2000,
the rules allowed the admission of TPI for the purpose of con-
tributing to the expert’s opinion—although not for adding to
evidence on matters that are not part of this opinion. Some 19
states currently have TPI-admissibility rules that are substan-
tively similar to the pre-revision version of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The 2000 FRE revision added a “prejudicial versus
probative” test in considering whether TPI should be admitted
as part of expert evaluations; this is the current federal stan-
dard, which has also been adopted by 18 states. Three states
allow TPI to be admitted only when it is a part of evidence that
has already been admitted or would otherwise be admissible.
Four states have applied a “trustworthiness” criterion to the
TPI-admissibility question, and the remaining six states have
rules that are distinct from all of these categories. Courts and
practitioners should be aware of both the importance of third-
party information and the relevant law regarding its admissi-
bility in their jurisdiction to observe the indicated balancing
test for the appropriate use of this important source of infor-
mation in forensic mental-health assessment.
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TABLE 3 (continued)
FEDERAL AND STATE RULES RELATED TO THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RELIED UPON BY EXPERT WITNESSES
JURISDICTION CATEGORY
RELEVANT RULE
OR CASE
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULE OR CASE
New
Mexico
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
N.M.R. Evid. 
11-703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reason-
ably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need
not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would other-
wise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only
if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs
their prejudicial effect.
New York
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Other
People v. Sugden,
35 N.Y.2d 453
(1974); People v.
Goldstein, 6
N.Y.3d 119 (2005)
Expert may provide opinions based on hearsay information “if it is of a kind accepted in
the profession as reliable in forming a professional opinion” (People v. Sugden). But,
experts may not relay statements from third parties to jury when those third parties
cannot be cross-examined; doing so would be a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause (People v. Goldstein).
North
Carolina
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
N.C.R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
North
Dakota
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
N.D.R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reason-
ably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need
not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would other-
wise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only
if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs
their prejudicial effect.
Ohio
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Experts can only
rely on admissi-
ble or admitted 
evidence
Ohio R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by the expert or admitted in evidence at the hearing.
Oklahoma
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
12 Okl. St. Ann.
§ 2703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in
order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inad-
missible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference
unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate
the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Oregon
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40.415
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Pennsylvania
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Pa. R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reason-
ably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need
not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.
Rhode Island
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Other
R.I.R. Evid. 
703
An expert’s opinion may be based on a hypothetical question, facts or data perceived by
the expert at or before the hearing, or facts or data in evidence. If of a type reasonably
and customarily relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions upon
the subject, the underlying facts or data shall be admissible without testimony from the
primary source.
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FEDERAL AND STATE RULES RELATED TO THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RELIED UPON BY EXPERT WITNESSES
JURISDICTION CATEGORY
RELEVANT RULE
OR CASE
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULE OR CASE
South 
Carolina
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
S.C.R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
South
Dakota
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
S.D. Codified
Laws § 19-
15-3
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in
order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inad-
missible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference
unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate
the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Tennessee
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Adds trust-
worthiness 
component 
Tenn. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative
value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect. The court shall disallow testimony in the form of an opinion or infer-
ence if the underlying facts or data indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Texas
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Tex. R. Evid. 
703; 705(d)
703: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by, reviewed by, or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admis-
sible in evidence.
705(d): When the underlying facts or data would be inadmissible in evidence, the court
shall exclude the underlying facts or data if the danger that they will be used for a pur-
pose other than as explanation or support for the expert’s opinion outweighs their value
as explanation or support or are unfairly prejudicial. If otherwise inadmissible facts or
data are disclosed before the jury, a limiting instruction by the court shall be given upon
request.
Utah
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Utah R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reason-
ably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need
not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would other-
wise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only
if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs
their prejudicial effect.
Vermont
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Vt. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in
order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inad-
missible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference
unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate
the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Virginia
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Other 
Va. Sup. Ct. R.
2:703
(a) Civil cases. In a civil action an expert witness may give testimony and render an
opinion or draw inferences from facts, circumstances, or data made known to or per-
ceived by such witness at or before the hearing or trial during which the witness is
called upon to testify. The facts, circumstances, or data relied upon by such witness in
forming an opinion or drawing inferences, if of a type normally relied upon by others in
the particular field of expertise in forming opinions and drawing inferences, need not
be admissible in evidence.
(b) Criminal cases. In criminal cases, the opinion of an expert is generally admissible
if it is based upon facts personally known or observed by the expert, or based upon
facts in evidence.
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FEDERAL AND STATE RULES RELATED TO THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RELIED UPON BY EXPERT WITNESSES
JURISDICTION CATEGORY
RELEVANT RULE
OR CASE
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULE OR CASE
Washington
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Wash. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
West
Virginia
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
W. Va. R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reason-
ably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they
need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would
otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury
only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially out-
weighs their prejudicial effect.
Wisconsin
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Wis. Stat. Ann.
907.03
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are
otherwise inadmissible may not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opin-
ion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the
jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion or inference substantially outweighs their prejudi-
cial effect.
Wyoming
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Wyo. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
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